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I examine the hypothesis that membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its
predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has increased the stability and
predictability of trade flows. I use a large data set covering annual bilateral trade flows between over
175 countries between 1950 and 1999, and estimate the effect of GATT/WTO membership on the
coefficient of variation in trade computed over 25-year samples, controlling for a number of factors.
I also use a comparable multilateral data set. There is little evidence that membership in the
GATT/WTO has a significant dampening effect on trade volatility.
Andrew K. Rose




arose@haas.berkeley.edu  1 
Executive Summary/Introduction  
In this short paper, I search for evidence that countries in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) experience 
more stable trade.  I find no consistent substantial differences in trade volatility between 




  This paper is motivated by the following statements, all taken from the website of the 
WTO (italics added): 
 
“The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the only international organization 
dealing with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to 




“The multilateral trading system is an attempt by governments to make the 
business environment stable and predictable.”
2 
“Non-discrimination is just one of the key principles of the WTO’s trading 
system. Others include: transparency (clear information about policies, rules and 
regulations); increased certainty about trading conditions (commitments to lower 
trade barriers and to increase other countries’ access to one’s markets are legally 
binding) …”
3 
“Just as important as freer trade — perhaps more important — are other principles 
of the WTO system. For example: non-discrimination, and making sure the 
conditions for trade are stable, predictable and transparent.”
4 
 
                                                 
1  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm  
2  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm 
3  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b08_e.htm  
4  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10mis_e/10m02_e.htm   2 
“One important way in which countries can demonstrate their commitment to 





I test below whether membership in the GATT/WTO has actually been associated 
with decreased trade volatility, which I equate with an increase in the predictability of 
trade.  That is, I ask: “Is membership in the GATT/WTO associated with more stable 
trade flows?”  This topic is of intrinsic interest for businesses and countries involved in 
international trade.  Since the WTO rationalizes its existence in part through its purported 
effect on trade stability, it should also of interest to international policymakers. 
Though there is a small amount of related research, there is, to my knowledge, no 
previous work that addresses this issue.  In Rose (2004), I ask an analogous question 
concerning the first-moment: “Does membership in the GATT/WTO affect the level of 
trade?”  While I found the answer to be essentially negative, Subramanian and Wei 
(2003), hereafter “SW”, dispute my conclusions.  I now extend the debate to consider the 
stability of trade, taking special account of the salient criticisms of SW. 
2: Empirical Methodology 
Estimating Equation 
I use a version of the conventional “gravity” model of bilateral international trade.  
Many economists have used the gravity model to estimate the effects of various 
institutions and policies and variables on bilateral trade flows; see e.g., Rose (2004) and 
SW.  Though it was designed to study the level of trade flows rather than their volatility, 
                                                 
5  Speech by WTO DG Moore, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spmm_e/spmm86_e.htm   3 
it seems a natural starting place to investigate second moments.  In particular, I estimate 
versions of: 
 
s(Xijt)t /µ(Xijt)t =  gi µ(WTOit)t + gj µ(WTOjt)t + ß0 µ(GSPijt)t + b1µ(FTAijt)t + b2µ(CUijt)t 
+ b3lnDij + b4,I µ(Yit)t + b4,j µ(Yjt)t + b5,i s(Yit)t + b5,j s(Yjt)t + b6,i µ(Popit)t+ b6,j µ(Popjt)t 
+ b7Langij + b8Contij + b9Landlij + b10Islandij +b11log(AreaiAreaj) + b12ComColij   
+ b13 µ(CurColijt)t  + b14Colonyij  + b15ComNatij + StftTt + eijt 
 
where i denotes the exporter, j denotes the importer, t denotes a year, t denotes a time period 
(twenty-five years is the default), and the variables are defined as: 
 
•  s(•)t and µ(•)t denote the standard deviation and mean operators, computed over period t, so 
that e.g., µ(Zt)t = (1/T) StZt for t in t,  
•  Xijt denotes the natural logarithm of real exports from i to j at time t, 
•  WTOi is a binary “dummy” that is one if i is a GATT/WTO member, and zero otherwise, 
•  GSPij is a binary variable that is one if i extends the GSP to j or vice versa, 
•  FTA is a binary variable that is unity if i and j both belong to the same regional trade 
agreement, 
•  CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t, 
•  D is the distance between i and j, 
•  Y is the natural logarithm of real GDP 
•  Pop is log population, 
•  Lang is a binary “dummy” variable which is unity if i and j have a common language and 
zero otherwise, 
•  Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border, 
•  Landl is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2). 
•  Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
•  Area is the area of the country,   4 
•  ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the 
same colonizer, 
•  CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t, 
•  Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or vice versa, 
•  ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during 
the sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe), 
•  {Tt} is a comprehensive set of time “fixed effects”, 
•  b and f are vectors of nuisance coefficients, and 
•  eij represents the omitted other influences on bilateral trade, assumed to be well behaved. 
 
  This is a reasonably conventional setup, with two differences from the traditional gravity 
model of trade.  First, it is estimated over time periods of twenty-five years, rather than (say) 
annually.  I do this since the question of interest to me concerns the determination of trade 
volatility, and volatility must be estimated over time.  The second exception is related; the 
dependent variable is the coefficient of variation for the natural logarithm of real bilateral 
exports, not the (log of the) level of (real bilateral) trade.
6  My strategy is to regress this on 
period-averages of the gravity variables (and also the period-volatilities of output) in order to 
control for other potential determinants of trade instability, above and beyond GATT/WTO 
membership.  I also use three other measures of trade volatility as robustness checks. 
The two parameters of interest to me are gi and gj.  The first coefficient measures the 
effect of exporter membership in the GATT/WTO on the stability of i's exports to j, while the 
second coefficient measures the effect of importer membership.   If membership in the 
GATT/WTO is associated with more stable trade policy, then the coefficients should be 
                                                 
6  An example may clarify things.  I generate the variable by first computing the log of real bilateral exports from 
(say) Australia to (say) Austria, which is available annually between (say) 1950 and 1974.  Using those twenty-five 
annual observations, I compute the sample standard deviation of (the log of real Australian) exports (to Austria 
between 1950 and 1974).  I then scale this by the analogously-computed sample average of (the log of real 
Australian) exports (to Austria between 1950 and 1974), to arrive at the coefficient of variation.     5 
negative, since membership would be associated with less volatile trade and hence a lower 




My equation is estimated using two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive twenty-
five-year intervals (1950 through 1974, and 1975-1999), derived from fifty years of underlying 
annual data.  I show below how my results vary when I use five- and ten-year periods instead of 
twenty-five-year periods. 
I estimate my equation in a number of different ways.  First, I use simple OLS on the 
pooled data set (denoted “pooled” below).  SW, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and others 
have criticized this estimation technique, since it does not take into account fixed country-
specific effects.  Thus I follow SW in relying more heavily on estimates which include two 
comprehensive sets of country-specific intercepts, one each for exporters and importers (“fixed 
importer and exporter effects”).  Third, I use conventional panel estimators, adding country pair-
specific (“dyadic”) fixed effects.  Finally, as a sensitivity check, I also model the country pair-
specific effects as being random rather than fixed.  In terms of confidence, I follow the 
profession in placing most confidence in the fixed effects estimators; I have no clear ranking 
between country-specific and country pair-specific effects.  
Throughout, I compute robust covariance matrices so as to account for heteroskedasticity 
(clustering with respect to dyads to account for this source of dependency), and I always include 
period-specific intercepts. 
                                                 
7  SW argue that the effects of GATT/WTO membership on the levels of trade should be stronger for importers than 
exporters, so there may be reason to believe that ?j can be more reliably expected to be negative.   6 
Since countries joined the GATT/WTO over time, my fixed effects estimators show the 
effect of accession on trade volatility, holding constant all observed and unobserved country- or 
country-pair effects.  A negative, economically and statistically significant estimate of (?i, ?j) 
indicates that exporters and importers that have joined the GATT/WTO enjoy dampened trade 
volatility compared with their pre-accession days.  When I pool my data across both time and 
countries without including fixed effects, I add variation across countries to this across-time 
variation.  That is, the pooled regressions answer the question “Do countries outside the 
GATT/WTO experience different trade volatility from insiders?” 
 
Data Sources 
The trade data for the regressand comes from the “Direction of Trade” (DoT) CD-ROM 
data set developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  It covers bilateral merchandise 
trade between 178 IMF trading entities between 1950 and 1999 (with gaps).  (Not all the trading 
entities are “countries” in the traditional sense of the word; I use the word simply for 
convenience.)  I include all countries for which the IMF provides data, so that almost all global 
trade is covered.  Bilateral trade on FOB exports and CIF imports is recorded in American 
dollars; I deflate trade by the American CPI for all urban consumers (1982-1984=100; taken 
from www.freelunch.com).  An average value of bilateral exports between a pair of countries is 
created by averaging both of the measures potentially available (exports from i to j and imports 
into j from i).
8 
GATT/WTO membership is taken from the website of the WTO.
9  Population and real 
GDP data (in constant American dollars) have been obtained from standard sources: the Penn 
                                                 
8  I also drop all observations where the coefficient of variation was either negative or greater than ten. 
9  Available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/gattmem_e.htm    7 
World Table mark 6.1 wherever possible, otherwise the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators, and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  I exploit the CIA’s World Factbook 
for a number of country-specific variables.
10  These include: latitude and longitude, land area, 
landlocked and island status, physically contiguous neighbors, language, colonizers, and dates of 
independence.  I use these to create great-circle distance and the other controls.  I add 
information on whether the pair of countries was involved in a currency union, using Rose 
(2004).  I obtain data from the World Trade Organization to create an indicator of regional trade 
agreements, and include: ASEAN, EEC/EC/EU; US-Israel FTA; NAFTA; CARICOM; 
PATCRA; ANZCERTA; CACM, SPARTECA, and Mercosur.
11  My GSP data is taken from and 
described by Rose (2004). 
Appendix 1 tabulates the countries covered in this data set, along with the date of 




  Benchmark results are tabulated in Table 1.  There are four sets of estimates, 
corresponding to the four estimation techniques (pooled, country-specific fixed effects for both 
exporters and importers, dyadic fixed effects, and dyadic random effects).  None provides 
compelling evidence that GATT/WTO membership reduces trade volatility significantly. 
  The simplest and most straightforward estimation technique is shown on the left-hand 
side; OLS on the pooled data set.  The good news is that exporters who are members of the 
GATT/WTO enjoy less volatile trade.  This effect is statistically significant; the robust t-statistic 
                                                 
10  Available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html 
11  Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm   8 
is 4.2.  Still, it is puzzling that importers inside the GATT/WTO experience significantly more 
volatile trade (the t-statistic is 2.8).  Further, the combined size of membership is small.  If both 
the exporter and importer are GATT/WTO members, the coefficient of export variation falls 
from a sample average of .181 by (-.024+.015=) .009 to .172, an amount which is economically 
and statistically insignificant (the t-statistic for the combined effect is 1.1). 
  Still, it seems reasonable to place more weight on the estimates that include country-
specific intercepts (for both exporters and importers, following SW).  These results are even 
more puzzling; GATT/WTO membership for either the exporter or the importer increases 
volatility, albeit by economically small (but statistically significant) amounts.
12  Results which 
use dyadic effects – either fixed or random – deliver economically and statistically marginal 
reductions in trade volatility.
13 
  Thus at first glance, it seems that membership in the GATT/WTO has no detectable 
strong effect on trade volatility; there is no clear sign of a significant reduction in the coefficient 
of variation for exports.  Nevertheless, this message comes with two caveats.  First, it should be 
noted that less than a fifth of the variation in the dependent variable is explained with the 
equation; that is, the model does not fit the data well.  Indeed, none of the estimation techniques I 
examine explain much of the variation in trade volatility.  Gravity is a model of trade flows, not 
trade volatilities.  A better model of trade volatility could, in principle, deliver more positive 
results for GATT/WTO membership. 
  A second important caution concerns the questions that can be addressed by the data.  It 
seems that countries that join the GATT/WTO do not experience more stable trade than they did 
                                                 
12  If both the exporter and importer are GATT/WTO members, trade volatility is estimated to rise by .07, with a t-
statistic of 3.1. 
13  Joint membership by both sides lowers trade volatility by .031 (t-statistic of 1.7) with fixed effects, and by .023 
(t-statistic of 2.1) with random effects.   9 
before accession.  In principle, the system could still have increased stability, if it has provided 
the public good of trade stability for both members and non-members equally.  Since the world 
has had the GATT/WTO since 1948, we do not have data from a world without the system.  
Thus the hypothesis that the very existence of the system has stabilized trade for all is untestable, 
and accordingly cannot be rejected. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  I now check the sensitivity of the (negative) results in Table 1 to a number of 
perturbations in the underlying methodology. 
  Table 2 checks the robustness of the results with respect to the exact sample of 
observations used to estimate the equation.  As the sample changes, so do both the number of 
observations and the average value of the dependent variable; both are recorded on top of the 
coefficient estimates.  For each sample, I provide results from all four estimation techniques 
(though the panel techniques can only be used when there are two time periods). 
  The first two rows tabulate results when the two periods are handled separately.  Next I 
examine only intra-industrial country trade, and then only trade between a pair of developing 
countries.
14  The next perturbation removes all country-pair observations where either country 
acceded to the GATT/WTO during the period, so that it was a member for only part of the 
sample.  I next drop all observations where the residual lies over three standard deviations from 
the mean, in order to reduce the role of outliers.  Finally, recall that a number of the variables – 
including the dependent variable – are period-averages (standard deviations, ...) estimated over a 
maximum of twenty-five years from underlying annual observations.  In my last check, I drop all 
                                                 
14  I follow SW and classify as industrial countries: Australia; Austria; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; 
Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Portugal; Spain; 
Sweden; Switzerland; UK: and USA.  Developing countries are all others.   10 
(dyad x period) observations which are derived from fewer than fifteen underlying annual 
observations. 
  None of these checks provide strong evidence that membership reduces trade volatility, 
with one potential exception.  While the effect of membership on trade volatility is often 
estimated to be negative, the results are typically economically significant, statistically small, or 
conflicting in the sense that membership by e.g., the exporter reduces volatility but importer 
membership is estimated to increase volatility.  The one possible exception is when only 
industrial countries are included in the sample (a group emphasized by SW).  In this case, both 
the pooled and the dyadic random-effect estimators deliver negative coefficients for both 
exporter and importer membership.  These effects are of only moderate statistical significance 
(indeed the hypothesis that both coefficients equal zero cannot be rejected at the 1% confidence 
level for any estimator).  Still, the estimates are economically non-trivial, and imply large 
reductions in trade volatility.  On the other hand, both the country- and country pair-fixed effects 
estimators (preferred by both me and SW) imply economically and statistically small effects on 
volatility. 
  Table 3 checks the sensitivity of the results by altering the specification of the equation.  
I first substitute three different regressands for the coefficient of variation.  These are, in turn: a) 
the maximal absolute value (during the 25-year sample period) of the difference between the log 
of real exports and the sample average of exports, scaled by the sample average; b) the mean 
absolute value, again of the difference between exports and their sample average (again, scaled 
by average exports); and c) the standard deviation of the residual from a conventional gravity 
equation of exports in levels.
15 Another row tabulates results when I add a lag of the dependent 
                                                 
15  To elaborate on the latter: I first run a conventional gravity equation, regressing the log of real exports on the log 
of distance, real GDP and population for both countries, GATT/WTO membership, and other controls.  This   11 
variable to the equation (which makes the equation only estimable for the second period).  
Finally, I drop all the economic controls, that is I set ß0= ß1=…=ß15=0. 
  Table 3, like its predecessor, reveals no consistent indication that the negative 
benchmark results are insensitive to the exact measure of volatility.  When dyadic fixed effects 
are included, the maximal deviation of trade falls by a statistical significant effect if both 
countries are GATT/WTO members, from a sample average of .313 to .239.  This result is 
sensitive to the estimation technique; it is estimated to be positive but small when country-
specific (as opposed to country pair-specific) fixed effects are included.  But the effects of 
GATT/WTO membership on export volatility are otherwise economically small, statistically 
insignificant, and inconsistent across exporters and importers, or some combination thereof. 
  Table 4 takes a different tack, and examines the data chopped into more time periods of 
shorter duration.  Dividing the data more finely over time has the advantages of requiring less 
stationarity in the data (since data moments can change more frequently), and allowing for more 
time-series variation.  On the other hand, each of the (dyad x period) observations is estimated 
less reliably, since it is derived from fewer underlying observations.  The first panel splits the 
data into five ten-year periods instead of two twenty-five year periods; the second examine ten 
five-year periods.  There are again no reliable indications that membership reduces volatility.  
While some of the point estimates are negative, many are positive.  The only time when both the 
exporter and importer point estimates are negative is when the data are estimated with the 
unreliable pooled OLS technique.  
 
Multilateral Evidence 
                                                                                                                                                             
regression is run with year effects on annual data pooled across countries; it delivers entirely conventional results.  I 
then use the residuals from this equation to generate period standard deviations for each country pair and time 
period.   12 
  A final way to check the sensitivity of my (non-) result is to move from the bilateral 
data set to a multilateral approach. 
  I estimate: 
 
s(Zij)t /µ(Zit)t =  g µ(WTOit)t + b1 µ(Yit)t + b2 s(Yit)t + b3 µ(Popit)t + b4 s(Popit)t  
+ b5 µ(REMOTEit)t + b6µ(CUit)t + b7µ(PUit)t  
+ b8log(Areai) + b9Islandi+ b10Landlij+ StftTt + eijt 
 
 
where the notation is the same as above except that i denotes the country, and the new variables 
are defined as: 
 
•  Zit denotes the natural logarithm of multilateral openness measured at current prices, that is 
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, 
•  REMOTEit is remoteness, the multilateral analogue to distance, measured as the (log) 
distance-weighted average of (log) GDP of the rest of the world, that is Sj(Yit/Dij);
16 and 
•  PU is a dummy variable denoting political union (e.g., between a colonizer and a colony). 
 
  I use openness data (as well as real GDP and population) from the Penn World Table 
Mark 6.1.  This data set covers 168 countries from 1950 through 2000 (with gaps). 
  Table 5 provides five different estimates of the coefficient of interest, ?, which 
represents the effect of GATT/WTO membership on the coefficient of variation for multilateral 
openness.  At the extreme left, I include a comprehensive set of country-specific intercepts as 
well as period (time) effects.  I then successively drop the period effects, the country effects, and 
the auxiliary regressors (that is, I include country- and period-effects but set ß0= ß1=…=ß10=0).  
                                                 
16  Fiji and New Zealand were the most remote countries in 1990, while Austria and Hungary were the least remote. 
   13 
Finally at the extreme right, I derive the dependent variable from openness measured in constant 
as opposed to current prices (again using data from PWT 6.1). 
  In all five perturbations, the effect of GATT/WTO membership on trade volatility is 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels (the largest absolute t-statistic for ? is 1.8, when 
country-effects are removed in the middle of the column).  Further, two of the five estimates are 
positive.  There is little clear evidence that joining or belonging to the GATT/WTO dampens 
multilateral trade volatility. 
 
4: Summary and Conclusion 
  In this short paper I have searched for indications that membership in the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
lowers trade volatility.  My hunt has been unsuccessful; I find no reliable evidence that 
membership increases the predictability of trade flows.  I use both bilateral and multilateral data 
sets that span over 175 countries and 50 postwar years.  I use a number of different econometric 
techniques, relying extensively on estimators that include fixed effects, and control for a host of 
potential factors.  Yet despite an extensive search and a number of robustness checks, I have not 
been able to find strong indications that the GATT/WTO makes trade flows more stable and 
predictable. 
  The WTO’s goal of making trade flow more predictably for its members is laudable; it 
is hard to imagine many benefits of trade volatility.  It is far from clear that the WTO has 
achieved this objective.   14 
Table 1: GATT/WTO Membership and Bilateral Trade Stability 
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(.01) 




















  -.08 
(.26) 
R
2  .11  .16  .07  .10 
Number of Observations = 26,312. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  Time effects included in all regressions. 
Regressand is coefficient of variation in log of real bilateral trade: standard deviation/mean.  Sample average = .181. 
Variables computed over non-overlapping 25-year intervals from annual data, 1950-1999.   15 
Table 2: GATT/WTO Membership and Bilateral Trade Stability:  
Sample Sensitivity Analysis 














































































































































Regressand is coefficient of variation in log of real bilateral trade: standard deviation/mean. 
Same (unrecorded) controls as in Table 1; time effects always included. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
Variables computed over non-overlapping 25-year intervals from annual data, 1950-1999.   16 
Table 3: GATT/WTO Membership and Bilateral Trade Stability:  
Specification Sensitivity Analysis 














































































































Regressand is coefficient of variation in log of real bilateral trade: standard deviation/mean. 
Same (unrecorded) controls as in Table 1; time effects always included. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
Variables computed over non-overlapping 25-year intervals from annual data, 1950-1999.   17 
Table 4: GATT/WTO Membership and Bilateral Trade Stability: 
Different Period Lengths 
























































Regressand is coefficient of variation in log of real bilateral trade: standard deviation/mean. 
Same (unrecorded) controls as in Table 1; time effects always included. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
Variables computed over non-overlapping intervals from annual data, 1950-1999.   18 
Table 5: GATT/WTO Membership and Multilateral Trade Stability 








  Period Effects    Period Effects  Period Effects  Period Effects 





















  -.04 
(.02) 






  .09 
(.05) 
















  -.03 
(.07) 






  -1.9 
(1.5) 






  -.01 
(.03) 






  .02 
(.02) 
Area      .001 
(.001) 
   
Island      .005 
(.006) 
   
Landlocked      -.004 
(.005) 
   
Obs.  267  267  267  269  267 
R
2  .68  .68  .24  .64  .99 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.   
Regressand is coefficient of variation in log of openness ((X+M)/Y) in current prices: standard deviation/mean. 
Variables computed over non-overlapping 25-year intervals from annual data, 1950-1999.   19 
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Appendix 1: Countries Included in Bilateral Data Set 
























Burkina Faso (1963) 












Congo, Dem. Rep. of (Zaire) (1971) 
Congo, Rep. (1963) 
Costa Rica (1990) 
Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) (1963) 
Croatia 
Cyprus (1963) 




Dominican Rep. (1950) 
Ecuador (1996) 
Egypt (1970) 




































Korea, South (R) (1967) 
Kuwait (1963) 
Kyrgyz Republic (1998) 

















































Sierra Leone (1961) 
Singapore (1973) 
Slovak Republic (1993) 
Slovenia (1994) 
Solomon Islands (1994) 
Somalia 
South Africa (1948) 
Spain (1963) 
Sri Lanka (1948) 
St. Kitts & Nevis (1994) 
St. Lucia (1993) 


















United Arab Emirates (1994) 
United Kingdom (1948) 






Yemen, Republic of 
Yugoslavia, Socialist Fed. R. (1966) 
Zambia (1982) 
Zimbabwe (1948) 
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics for Bilateral Data Set 
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Coefficient of Variation, Log Real Exports  .18  .35 
Country in GATT/WTO   .65  .43 
GSP Relationship   .17  .34 
Regional Trade Arrangement  .01  .09 
Monetary Union  .01  .11 
Log Distance  8.11  .84 
Mean GDP  8.39  1.02 
Standard Deviation GDP  .27  .15 
Mean Population  9.00  1.81 
Common Language  .21  .40 
Common Border  .03  .17 
Number Landlocked  .28  .49 
Number Island States  .34  .54 
Log Area Product  23.6  3.54 
Common Colonizer  .10  .30 
Current Colony  .004  .061 
Ever Colony  .02  .14 
Common Country  .002  .043 
Exports: Maximal Absolute Deviation, Scaled  .31  .48 
Exports: Mean Absolute Deviation, Scaled  .14  .28 
Standard Deviation of Export Gravity Residual  1.15  .88 
Variables computed over non-overlapping 25-year intervals from annual data, 1950-1999. 
 